Just playing devil's advocate and I know as we currently stand it's pie in the sky stuff, but if a country didn't have to give £8.9b to countries such as Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, etc. and we had a free trade deal similar to CETA, where they also have control of their borders (Yes, I know the argument that we already do) and laws and legislation wasn't suggested to us by other nations then surely most Countries would want that rather than being part of the EU?
So I'd say this is always an interesting argument, because I think at its root it's one that comes not from a place of "value" as normally constructed - in the sense of how economics is often framed, where the thing that costs us less money is better than the thing that costs us more money - but instead it's about less tangible, more abstract measurements of value: culture, identity, diplomacy, fairness, perceptions of those who are different to ourselves, history, and the stories that nations tell themselves about each other.
For many, many Europeans - clear majorities in most of the EU, in fact - this kind of argument just doesn't make sense, because "suggested to us by other nations" isn't a description of how the EU works. It's like being in a band or a football team, or on the board of a company, and having a mutual interest in seeing a venture succeeding. Sometimes you might not be in the majority when a decision is made, but in a well-functioning decision-making group everyone should feel that they get what they want from a decision more often than they don't. And much of what has happened to the EU post-Maastricht - even the actual idea of the EU, rather than the EEC - is, in part, that it's about injecting democratic checks and balances into the global economic-diplomatic trading system, which is usually only changed through one-to-one (or many-to-many, or one-to-many) negotiations between heads of government. Just look at NAFTA, for example, or the recent issues around the ratification of the TPP, where there aren't multinational representatives elected by normal people who can represent their interests in negotiations or implementations.
Of course, introducing democracy into an economic system like this in such piecemeal ways over the last 30ish years has just made it clear how undemocratic the system still remains (although, arguably, post-Lisbon it's not significantly less democratic than the current UK constitution) - and it's clear that further reforms are needed to address the democratic deficit. But fundamentally, the EU provides a number of fora for countries to discuss how to mutually aid each other across a continent of half a billion people, and for the people of those countries to also commune with each other. It removes borders, it integrates economies and cultures, and it has successfully turned a part of the world that was responsible for the two most destructive wars in human history into a gentleman's club where tensions lead to parliamentary disputes, not bloodshed, and we've all been hugely the richer for it. And, it also goes without saying that the power of the EU as a bloc is immensely larger than any single member, including the big three of France/Germany/UK. International economic trading is bloc-based, and has been for decades now, and it's suicide to think you can go it alone as Denmark or Portugal or Austria or, yes, even the UK.
But then, that's why we're in this situation. This kind of framing of the EU as a fundamentally cooperative entity - albeit one with issues (bureaucracy, accountability, corruption, etc.) - has never been a part of British politics except in the most europhilic fringes. (Although notable that those fringes weren't, pre-referendum, particularly smaller or less influential than the eurosceptic fringes have and continue to be. In all the contradictory polling about what would happen in a second referendum, whether we should go for no deal or May's deal, should we revoke article 50, etc., is that that one consistent finding has been that most people don't care, and never really cared, about all of these issues enough to sway the way they voted, with the exception of the referendum, the one time since the last referendum that it was the only issue under consideration.) In the UK, the EU has been long framed by politicians of all ideologies as an external force apart from the UK, and the UK is a kind of "rule-taker". This is completely ahistorical - despite its late entry into the EEC, the last half a century has seen the UK (along with France and Germany) shape the EU effectively in many areas to reflect its values and geopolitical interests, as many of its smaller members will point out. It is an augmentation of national power, not a parasite. And the opt-outs that the UK has secured, as well as its vetoes, mean that the worst fears of those who dislike further integration - such as a centralised army - are simply fantasy. (Or, well, they were, until the UK decided to leave meaning the rest of the club can get on with the things the UK was getting in the way of for so long.) From the perspective of the rest of the EU, the UK already had a deal (outside Schengen, outside the Euro) that meant it got the upsides of cooperation without the downside of compromise, and to throw its toys out of the pram so consistently is gauche and offensive.
Yet you have to consider the national myths, the national stories, the gut feelings, the historical contexts. WW2 isn't a tragedy here, it's a triumph. Our island mentality inculcates a kind of petty xenophobia about other European nationals that is uniquely derogatory among our neighbours. Free movement, for example, is bundled in with ex-EU immigration here, whereas the two are typically distinguished in domestic debates about migration in other EU countries. The huge and powerful influence the UK has as a rule-shaper at the EU level is absent from British politics and media, with politicians happy for years to outsource the blame for necessary but unpopular legislation onto "the Brussel bureaucrats". And, of course, we have a domestic tradition, concentrated on the right of the Conservative party, which is ideologically rabid about idealised conceptions of free trade, swashbuckling "open Britain", low taxes, "Singapore of the Atlantic", deregulation, privatisation, "Empire 2.0", etc. The UK's political constitution allowed this group to spend years wielding absolute parliamentary power on the back of minority shares of the popular vote (thanks, FPTP!), and there simply isn't a tradition of political cooperation across party lines as there is in other European countries with proportional representation. A significant factor for why domestic British politics is in such a volatile state is that David Cameron was so terrified of his coalition with the Lib Dems falling apart that he
changed the constitution to make it almost impossible for a ruling government to be thrown out of office by Parliament due to a vote of no confidence. We'd have had a new general election months ago otherwise.
When you mix all of these things together, you get the situation we're in now:
- Widespread and deep lack of comprehension across the country, from both the populace at large and elites, about how the EU works;
- Mythologized imaginings of the past, informing a future that will never come;
- Zombie economics;
- A political establishment, especially (though not totally) on the right, which is nepotistic and has long been populated with low-knowledge, incompetent people who are there because of systemic privilege and not talent or ability;
- An approach to negotiating with the EU which is based on a history of assuming it is a rival rather than understanding it was a tool for our own success;
- Internal party politics overriding the necessity for the construction of broader coalitions which more justly represent the "will of the people"
- And, most fundamentally, a clash between two ways of constructing value, with one side valuing the symbolic/emotional nature of leaving the EU over another side's economic argument to remain (and yes, you do get economic arguments to leave and symbolic/emotional arguments to remain, but those are both very very much in the minority in the UK conversation)
So to go back to the CETA example that this is a response to, here's why that can't work:
- The UK has obligations to its allies and friends and, yes, rivals, and that includes treaties like the Good Friday Agreement. You can't pick and choose when it comes to these kinds of obligations, because once you decide to just ignore something you promised to do, you're completely fucked in future trade deals (why should anyone trust you?). This is why the backstop on the Irish border will never be removed. The British government's behaviour has done nothing but reinforce the Irish perception of its necessity, and the EU, despite the framing in the UK, exists to protect its members.
- A CETA-type deal (or, as some eurosceptics in my life put it, "back to how it was before Maastricht") still brings with it economic disruption, while also permanently putting the UK outside of the systems for making rules. You may not like how a company determines its strategies, but you will have far more success influencing that as a member of the board rather than as one person picketing outside head office.
- The money we "give" to the EU isn't charitable aid, in the same way that the wealth generated in London isn't "aid" when it's used to fix potholes or upgrade train lines (hah!) in Yorkshire. Increasing the wealth of the others in the bloc increases the wealth for everyone, and the "cost" of being a member of the EU is returned many times over in terms of the economic growth it engenders. Arguing that keeping this money is a "saving" in a CETA-type scenario is like arguing that you you'd rather save your existing savings than spend it on the car or public transport to get to a new job.
- This is also the same argument as to why freedom of movement makes sense. We don't need a passport to go across county borders because for one thing it would cause a huge economic drag, but also there is the cultural, cooperative angle as I detailed above, and, for what it's worth, I think the loss of freedom of movement is one of the biggest tragedies in all this. I'm 31, and, for people my age, having a friend or colleagues from Romania or Holland or Spain is about as glamorous as having a friend from Scotland or Cornwall. That's
incredible.
For what it's worth, I myself always considered myself to be something of a left eurosceptic, not far off Corbyn's Bennite position on it - hell, I'm in a significant minority in the EU, let alone the UK, in that I value freedom of movement
more than I value the other pillars of the single market. (I am radically anti-borders in general and would love to be inside Schengen.) But I voted remain, because the basis for the referendum, and the people who would be in charge of enacting it, were so clearly... the worst. They suck so much. And the biggest part of that, for me, is that they are just so unwilling to compromise, to see outside of their narrow view of reality, and accept that sometimes you have to cooperate. It shouldn't be a surprise that these people can't do it at home when they couldn't do it away.
A cannier government might have made Brexit a "success" of sorts, but I don't think that the British system as it stands is capable of producing a government of that calibre. I'm not sure whether that's ever going to happen again in the foreseeable future, either, seeing as how much this process has gummed up the wheels of democracy.
Actually, could Brexit ever be successful, on the terms we're talking here - returning things to a purely economic relationship, without the political checks and balances? I think that there might have been something that could have been done early on, before invoking Article 50, if the UK had understood that cooperation and trust was such a powerful tool. It could have involved speaking with Switzerland, with Turkey, Norway, Iceland, and other countries on the periphery of the EU; offer them the chance to form a new bloc, and offer the EU the chance to get the political integration some of its members so desire, but using the leverage of a united ex-EU, in-customs union bloc, working together, as leverage against being the "rule-taker" that the British political class hates so much. But it would still require working with other countries, and not being this fantasy, independent, swashbuckling "open Britain" that lives and thrives and dies alone. It would also be the "two-speed" Europe that the real europhiles say can't happen, but then Brexit wasn't supposed to happen, so who knows?
Ah, I'm depressed again now. Can't wait to see how this shitshow continues when we start the whole WA rejection process all over again next week. Bleh.